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The State of the Law of Protecting and Securing the
Rights of Same-Sex Partners in Illinois Without
Benefit of Statutory Rights Accorded Heterosexual
Couples
Richard A. Wilson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal recognition of and protection for the rights and interests of
same-sex couples remains elusive-if not altogether nonexistent-in
Illinois, 1 and not much more or less so nationally, despite recent
changes in the law in many jurisdictions. 2 This is true as to the couple's
relationship3 as well as to their legal claims.
4
* Richard A. Wilson received his JD from Loyola University Chicago, 1992; Post-graduate,
School of the Art Institute of Chicago, 1985-1988; BA cum laude, Loyola University Chicago,
1982. The author wishes to acknowledge and thank his longtime companion, partner, significant
other, spouse, Samuel Burckhardt, with whom he has enjoyed twenty-four years of mostly
unrecognized marriage-like bliss, despite a legal, yet unrecognized marriage under Illinois law in
Toronto in December 2003 and, with few exceptions, without incident and with acknowledgment
if not recognition by family, friends and associates (and, frankly, without whom his law school
education would likely not have occurred as and when it did). Mr. Wilson is principal in his own
firm in Chicago, concentrating on litigation and appellate practice relating to domestic relations
law and legal issues, with particular emphasis on same-sex issues, including domestic
partnerships, parentage, custody and visitation, and related concerns and rights of persons in
same-sex relationships. He is Chair of the National Lesbian and Gay Law Association (effective
September 2006); an appointed member and Chair (June 2006) of the Illinois State Bar
Association's Standing Committee on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity; and immediate
past-Chair of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Legal Rights of Lesbians and Gay
Men (2004-2005 and 2005-2006).
1. Specifically with respect to same-sex marriage with few exceptions; many states by statute
or case law provide for lesser or alternative forms of recognition or protection of same-sex
relationships, such as domestic partnerships or civil unions. See infra Part III.B (outlining the
state of marriage laws in Illinois).
2. See infra Part III.A (describing marriage laws as they exist in other states and
internationally).
3. That is, recognition and/or protection founded on the relationship itself and not the person
or the interest alleged. This description includes recognition of such relationships when intact,
and also remedies upon dissolution, such as actions for enforcement of agreements made between
the parties and actions for enforcement of interests and rights alleged, whether to property, to
children or to support.
4. Including discrete claims made, interests alleged, or benefits sought by the parties in such
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These relationships are typically understood by constitution or
formation as generally monogamous relationships of emotional and
financial interdependence between two persons based upon a shared
commitment whether proclaimed or not. In addition, they are without
resort to and distinguished from the institution of marriage whether or
not marriage is available. They are distinguished from marriage not by
gender per se but by the inability to marry where the gender of the
parties prevents it, or by the choice not to marry where the gender of the
parties does not. Agreements or contracts formed by the individuals in
such relationships are broadly referred to as either cohabitation or
domestic partnership agreements. 5 Legal rights are implicated both in
the pursuit of recognition for the relationship while intact-or for
benefits based upon the status of the relationship-and also in the
pursuit of rights and remedies by the parties against one another, or by
third parties, upon dissolution.
Advising clients who are in same-sex domestic relationships is
complicated by the lack of legal protections afforded such relationships,
the legal barriers to enforcement of agreements between persons
attendant upon such relationships, 6 and the increasing legal uncertainty
brought about by the escalating political and legal conflicts surrounding
same-sex marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships. 7  This
includes the problem of recognition and increasing conflicts of
recognition from one jurisdiction to another of various arrangements, 8
relationships, where the claim or interest may or may not be dependent upon or legally
indistinguishable from the relationship or its consideration. In the alternative, although the claim
may not be dependent upon the relationship, the relationship often is used as a bar to defeat it.
5. Typically these terms are gender-based. While cohabitation has historically been used to
refer to two persons of the opposite sex who live together without marrying, the denomination of
such relationships between two persons of the same sex was rarely discussed, as arrangements of
this kind were not acknowledged or, at least, their existence was not a topic of discussion. With
increasing consciousness of the existence of homosexual or same-sex relationships, the term
"cohabitation" has been supplanted, or separately classified, by use of the term "domestic
partnership." Today, both terms are used to refer to the "unmarried" living arrangement of two
persons and are usually denominated or qualified by the gender of the couple (opposite sex or
same sex). Generally, where the gender of the parties is opposite, the relationship is called
"cohabitation" and agreements formed by the parties attendant upon such relationships,
"'cohabitation agreements"; where the gender of the parties is the same, the relationship is
generally referred to as a "domestic partnership" and agreements formed, "domestic partnership
agreements."
6. In certain jurisdictions, such barriers also exist for unmarried couples of the opposite sex
who are capable of being married. See infra Part II (explaining that the difference between
marriage and its alternatives is primarily one of status).
7. See infra Part III.A.1 and 2 (describing same-sex marriage and alternatives to marriage as
they exist in the United States and abroad).
8. Including the lack of comparable legal protections, based upon the "right to marry" or the
availability of marriage in a given jurisdiction, which is, or can be, a paramount distinction when
The Rights of Same-Sex Partners in Illinois
further complicated by the increasing number and variety of statutory
schemes designed to recognize or protect-or both-the rights of
persons in same-sex relationships, distinct from and as alternatives to
marriage. 9
This article will examine the rights and interests of persons in same-
sex relationships of emotional and financial interdependence,
particularly under and from the viewpoint of Illinois law. Additionally,
it will address the greater problem of recognition of such relationships,
the pursuit of rights or interests, and enforcement of remedies attendant
upon their dissolution. The point of reference is from the practice of
what remains essentially a state law concern.10 This state law concern
is marriage and its alternatives." These alternatives require
agreements. 12 For relationships where both persons are of the same sex,
such agreements-a function of both contract law and the public policy
of the state-were (and in most jurisdictions, including Illinois, remain)
the only option given the unavailability of the legal right to marry. 
13
The point of departure for this discussion is marriage itself, given the
legal sanction of the institution by the state. Despite the Illinois
Supreme Court's decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt,14 the rights and interests
of unmarried couples under Illinois law are inseparable from a
consideration of, as well as defined and measured in light of or in
reference to, marriage--even where, for same-sex couples at least,
marriage for the most part remains unavailable. 15
determining the rights of unmarried persons in such relationships, who are of opposite gender,
and for whom such a right is not questioned. See infra Part I (discussing the problem of contract
recognition without status recognition).
9. See infra Part III.A.2 (detailing alternatives to marriage in a variety of states and countries).
10. In the United States; excepting a) other jurisdictions relevant to and discussed in this
article, where the marriage laws at discussion are either national (e.g., the Netherlands, Belgium,
Spain, South Africa) or have been formally adopted nationally (e.g., Canada, 2005) in response to
changes by provincial or state governments; and b) the provisions of the "Defense of Marriage
Act" (DOMA), 29 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000). See infra note 21 (describing
DOMA provisions).
11. Included, of course, are the rights and remedies of persons in relationships who choose not
to marry, or who form relationships of emotional and financial interdependence by choice or by
happenstance, whether or not the right to marry is available to them, and irrespective of their
gender. State law is implicated both as to the whole relationship and as to interests independent
of it.
12. Including agreements the parties reach in an effort to define and secure their rights in the
relationship vis-a-vis one another, and as an entity vis- -vis society as a whole.
13. Although statistically very few same-sex couples enter into express contracts or written
agreements.
14. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979); see infra Part II.B.2 (analyzing Hewitt and considering its
continuing impact).
15. The discussion necessarily presumes and will examine these rights as to two groups: those
2007]
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What rights and remedies do persons of the same sex have in
securing and in seeking redress upon the break-up or dissolution of their
relationships, whether legally sanctioned as marriage, civil union, or
domestic partnership, or unrecognized by the law; and what advice can
practitioners give to their clients who seek legal protection of such
rights and interests? The question is neither readily nor reliably
answered. The reality of the changing and conflicting legal landscape
for same-sex couples seeking recognition of their relationships is
complicated by mobility-including both the historic (and
constitutionally protected) mobility of Americans and the increasing
residency here of foreign nationals for work-for extended periods of
time during which property is acquired and relationships are formed
(and often fail). The question is further complicated by the willingness
of same-sex couples to travel elsewhere to obtain legally valid
marriages in other jurisdictions, and return to their state of residence
and demand recognition of, or seek redress based upon, the marriage
upon dissolution.
The recent legalization of same-sex marriage for the first time by an
American state 16-Massachusetts, effective May 17, 2004 17-has not
changed things in Illinois, where no such legal remedy exists and where
such marriages, wherever obtained, are not recognized. For relation-
ships between persons of the opposite gender, things have not changed
much either.
The conflicts and concerns for the practitioner advising clients in
such relationships are many. Persons in such relationships typically
lack rights based upon or rooted in the relationship between them, other
than legal devices or claims found at law based upon ownership of
who are unmarried either because they lack the right to marry or the right is not recognized in
Illinois, and those for whom the right to marry exists, but who choose not to do so in any case.
For the former group, generally same-sex couples, the lack of a right to marry precludes the
question of choice. For the latter, the existence of the right presumes the fight to choose to
exercise it or not, and here the discussion will include or other issues which may arise in the quest
for recognition of an unmarried relationship, or for pursuit of remedies when it fails, where the
right to marry was available.
16. Following the Netherlands (2001); Belgium (2002); the Canadian provinces and territories
of Ontario and British Columbia (2003), Quebec (2004), Yukon Territory (2004), Manitoba and
Nova Scotia (2004), and nationally, throughout Canada, 2005; Spain (2005) and South Africa
(December 1, 2005, to take effect within one year). Peter W. Hogg, Canada: The Constitution
and Same-Sex Marriage, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 712 (2006); Amy K.R. Zaske, Love Knows No
Borders-The Same-Sex Marriage Debate and Immigration Laws, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
625, 641 (2006); Michael Wines, Same-Sex Unions to Become Legal in South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005, at A12.
17. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Opinions of the Justices
to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004).
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property, parentage, etc., and independent of the status of the
relationship, resulting in difficulties in attempts to secure benefits or
interests otherwise available to married persons. Acquisition of
property during the relationship creates no interests or estates vested or
protected at law in the relationship; rather, such interests remain with
the individual independently. Additionally, rights and relationships to
children do not arise from the relationship-unlike in a marriageI'-but
are solely a function of parentage. Accordingly, persons in such
relationships must, where parentage is not defined by a biological
relationship to the child, secure such rights independently. 19
Other problems arise particularly upon the dissolution of the
relationship and the attendant division of property and interests between
the parties. These include, for example, the sudden or unprecedented
assertion of rights by an individual without regard to the historical
reality of the relationship; 20 the incursion of tax liabilities for the
transfer of assets between the parties, from which married persons are
exempt; the lack of a right to spousal support; and the lack of legal
protection of parentage rights otherwise available to married persons or
arising from the marital relationship.
Finally, or increasingly, "last but not least," there is the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA). 21  Even if the relationship is recognized or
perhaps even protected, the Federal "Defense of Marriage Act"22 both
18. Under the laws of most states, a child born to a marriage is presumed to be the child of
each parent. V. Woerner, Annotation, Presumption of Legitimacy, or of Paterniy, of Child
Conceived or Born Before Marriage, 57 A.L.R. 2D 729 § 1 (b) (1958).
19. Subject, perhaps, to equitable claims upon dissolution or for other reasons. See infra Part
III.B.5 (explaining how parties can make claims independent of their relationship in the event of
dissolution).
20. Denying or ignoring, for example, the fact that the parties to the relationship were of the
same gender and using the legal disability of the other, and/or the social opprobrium surrounding
the relationship, or both, as a sword, e.g., by asserting biological claims of parentage where the
relationship was based upon other claims or asserting the illegality or prevailing social and legal
disfavor of the relationship in an attempt to gain a legal advantage upon its dissolution.
21. Defense of MarriageAct, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000)), which, in its two constituent parts, on the one hand
"permitted" states to refuse to recognize valid marriages between persons of the same-sex
performed in other states, 28 U.S.C. 1738C (2000), and on the other created a federal definition of
marriage for purposes of federal programs and interests, by declaring that "the word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife," 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2000).
22. The Act, widely believed to be unconstitutional, has never been tested on its merits.
although for the first time a federal court has declared part of it constitutional in denying a joint
bankruptcy petition of two women validly married in British Columbia. In re Kandu, 315 B.R.
123, 138 (Bankr. D. Wash. 2004). Its applicability to marriage laws is questionable in any case,
given that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned with judgments of the various states, and
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prohibits the recognition of same-sex relationships under federal law,
creating an integral conflict between federal jurisdiction (e.g., taxation,
bankruptcy, social security rights) 23 and state jurisdiction governing
domestic partnership (civil union or marital status), and "authorizes" the
unprecedented and constitutionally questionable federal sanction for
states to refuse to recognize valid marriages between persons of the
same sex from other states.
II. THE PROBLEM CONCEPTUALLY: STATUS VS. CONTRACT
RECOGNITION AND RELATED ISSUES
The fundamental distinction between marriage and its alternatives 24
is status. Unlike marriage, nonmarriage-type relationships (including
statutory schemes creating "civil unions" or "domestic partnerships")
lack fundamental protection for the status of the relationship itself. This
lack of status requires the parties and the practitioner to seek protections
for the rights and interests of the parties piecemeal, and often by
contract. Further, a state's "recognition" of an alternative to marriage
by creation of a status of civil union or domestic partnership typically
involves the creation of a body of law of rights and responsibilities
wholly distinct from and not mirrored or otherwise found in the state's
marriage laws.
In reality, the rights and interests of same-sex persons in such
relationships, lacking the legal protection of marriage, is governed by
contract, with few exceptions. 25  The distinction is fundamental.
Marriage is-at least throughout the United States and for the most part
the rest of the world-a legally sanctioned status, not an expressly con-
tractual relationship. 26 The status is itself fairly uniform from state to
although a dissolution of marriage is a judgment, a marriage itself is not; and, second, the Act
specifically makes reference to the "States" and not to foreign countries, whose marriage laws are
in any case historically recognized in this country not by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which
applies to the states, but the Treaties Clause of the Constitution, and long held and established
principles of comity.
23. Federal prohibitions to recognition of same-sex relationships are implicated, under federal
law, where the claims or interests involve questions of federal law or jurisdiction (tax, bankruptcy,
social security, self-insured benefits plans, and the like).
24. See infra Part III for a discussion of other forms or types of formalized relationships.
25. See infra Part III for a discussion of legislated alternatives such as civil unions and
domestic partnerships.
26. The vows of "I do" and the attendant duties and responsibilities notwithstanding; while the
proposal ("Will you marry me?") and its response may fairly be said to constitute
offer/acceptance, there is little evidence that parties to a marriage make any further negotiations
or consult their state's marriage laws to determine their rights and responsibilities. In fact, it is
the ascendancy of ante- or pre-nuptial agreements that has brought contract law into the marriage
arena-not the act of marrying-and despite the formal legal acceptance of such practice when
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state, and since the late 1960s, marriages valid where celebrated have
been, with few exceptions, recognized in other states.27 There are three
distinct and mostly uniform characteristics to the status at law: the rights
and interests of the couple as a couple are derived from the status itself;
the status lacks definition at law, upon formation; and the status is uni-
formly, with few exceptions, recognized.28 Derived from the status as a
social and legal construct, not a bargained-for, expressly enumerated
transaction, the rights of married persons and the legal protections-the
"benefits and burdens"-of marriage are neither inherently nor in fact a
matter of contract. Neither are they set forth in any detail in a given
state's marriage statutes. Marriage laws from state to state and country
to country typically contain neither contractual prerequisites nor any
enumerated definition of status at law, upon formation-but instead set
forth who may marry (requirements of residency, age, opposite gender
in most jurisdictions, and unmarried status) and who may not (require-
ments of unmarried status and lack of certain prohibited relationships
between the parties). It is in the dissolution provisions of such laws (or
separately, where applicable), where the expectation of redress upon
dissolution or divorce arises, and the rights and interests of the parties
and the marital estate upon dissolution, are defined.
certain conditions are adhered to they remain the exception, not the norm, for obvious reasons.
See, e.g., The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 et seq. (2006),
adopted in Illinois in 1990, PA 86-1028 (outlining to which rights and responsibilities parties to a
premarital agreement may contract).
27. This has been increasingly true since 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court, in Loving v
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), barred state laws prohibiting marriage based upon racial difference.
Thereafter, the recognition of marriages from state to state has been governed by the principle of
"valid where celebrated." Marriages valid where celebrated were recognized as valid in other
states, even if the state had a specific prohibition against the marriage (e.g., between cousins).
The few exceptions were where residents went elsewhere to obtain marriages prohibited within
their state, or on the basis of specific public-policy provisions in the state's law. Additionally,
although not the subject of this article, the trend toward uniform recognition of marriages valid
where celebrated since Loving has been wholly compromised in reaction to the legalization of
same-sex marriage, resulting in exceptions to the doctrine embodied in numerous efforts to
amend state and federal law-both statutory and constitutional-permitting exception to such
recognition where it involves marriages obtained by persons of the same sex.
28. The exceptions typically involve formation issues (i.e., who may marry), and a given
state's prohibitions to marriage of its own citizens under certain circumstances, and recognition of
certain marriages performed elsewhere under the same, or other, defined criteria. See, e.g., 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) ("The following marriages are prohibited [. ] (5) a marriage
between two persons of the same sex.").
2007]
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By contrast, lacking any status at law,29 the normalization or
protection of relationships of emotional and financial interdependence
outside of marriage is primarily accomplished by contract. Accordingly,
the rights and interests are first a function of contract law, second a
question of recognition on other grounds even if valid under contract
law, and third, a matter of detail, as rights, interests, scope, and coverage
differ from one couple to the next-none of which is a prerequisite to a
valid recognized marriage from which, alone, all else typically flows.
The legal rights of domestic partners in order to be secured by legal
means, are a function of the laws of offer, acceptance, and
consideration, 30 which results, by definition, in myriad arrangements
and at least as many legal questions, and, inevitably, the lack of
uniformity of recognition from state to state that is inherent in the status
of marriage.
III. THE LANDSCAPE
A. The Rest of the World, Including Illinois
A bit of foundation is in order. Marriage and its alternatives can be
organized according to the type of arrangement made available by law
either irrespective of, or by definition with reference to, the gender of
the parties. Most state marriage laws now make reference to the gender
of the parties. 31 Same-sex marriage laws are accomplished either by
removal of the gender restrictions in the law, or the express restriction
of marriage to persons of the same sex by separate statute or otherwise.
The availability of alternatives such as civil unions, domestic
29. Notwithstanding the formal statewide legal sanction, as a matter of state law, of
"Reciprocal Beneficiaries" (Hawaii, 1997); domestic partnerships (New Jersey, 2004; Maine,
2004; and California, 1999); and "civil unions" (Vermont, 1998; Connecticut, 2005). See infra
notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
30. Yet few same-sex relationships typically seek legal protection and, by contrast, anecdotal
evidence consistently demonstrates that those same-sex couples who seek to marry typically do
so without reference to contractual bargains or express agreements, but instead by reference to
and in pursuit of the same paramount right and benefit of marriage: the status itself and its simple
and historical place in the realm of social construct per se.
31. Many states amended their marriage laws to include gender-based distinctions where they
had not existed before, in reaction to the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1993, in Baehr
v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) (plurality), which, in response to suit by same-sex couples for the
right to marry, declared marriage to be a fundamental right and remanded the case for
determination of whether the state could prove a compelling state interest in prohibiting same-sex
marriage. Id. at 55, 67-68. The response to the decision in Baehr saw the passage of the
"Defense of Marriage Act" [DOMA], see supra notes 21-22, and a concurrent wave of
amendments of state marriage laws both to require marriage to be between persons of the
opposite sex, where such requirements had not existed, and to permit the state to refuse to
recognize such marriages from other states in response to and reliance on DOMA.
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partnerships, or other status types, may or may not be gender-specific.
Finally, there is common-law marriage, which in certain states could be
a basis for a claim by a couple of the same gender.
1. Marriage
Approximately thirty-nine states have statutory bars to same-sex
marriage, require a valid marriage to be between two persons of
opposite gender, or both.32 In 2004, thirteen states passed state
constitutional amendments forbidding marriage between persons of the
same sex or requiring marriage to be between two persons of opposite
gender, or both, primarily based upon political moves motivated by a
belief that state statutory prohibitions are not sufficient. 33 Many states,
including Illinois, list same-sex marriages among "prohibited"
marriages for purposes of recognition, 34 including marriages valid
where obtained. Further, many states, including Illinois, have statutory
prohibitions precluding recognition of or declaring void, or both,
marriages obtained elsewhere by residents of the state, which could not
be obtained in the state.35  As of May 2006, same-sex marriage had
32. Illinois law requires a) parties to a marriage be of opposite gender, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/201 (2004); b) that the license issue upon, inter alia, the "satisfactory proof that the marriage is
not prohibited" 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/203(2) (2004); c) that the marriage is not prohibited, 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (2004) ("The following marriages are prohibited [. .] (5) a
marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex."); and d) that the marriage be deemed valid
where it is not violative of public policy, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213 (2004). Note that the
public policy of the state forbids same-sex marriage: "A marriage between 2 individuals of the
same sex is contrary to the public policy of this State." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213.1 (2004). In
addition, the statute declares void marriages by state residents obtained elsewhere if not permitted
under Illinois law. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216 (2004).
33. Since the November 2004 national elections, three states have passed such state
constitutional amendments: Kansas (April 2005); Texas (November 2005) and Alabama (June
2006). There are six states with such proposed state constitutional bans on upcoming ballots:
Idaho, Tennessee, South Carolina, South Dakota, Virginia, and Wisconsin (all in November
2006). Human Rights Campaign, http://www.hrc.org. (follow hyperlink "Your Community")
(last visited Nov. 10, 2006). Illinois has not placed such a measure on the ballot here, despite
repeated attempts by certain groups to do so, most recently in the form of a proposed "advisory
referendum" that proposed that "to secure and preserve the benefits of marriage for our society
and for future generations of children, a marriage between a man and a woman is the only legal
union that shall be valid or recognized in this State." Protect Marriage Illinois v. Orr, 463 F.3d
604, 605 (7th Cir. 2006).
34. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (2004) (prohibiting marriages between "2
individuals of the same sex").
35. Marriages obtained by Illinois residents in another jurisdiction, which are prohibited under
Illinois law, are void in Illinois. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/216 (2004). See, e.g., Lynch v. Bowen,
681 F. Supp. 506, 512 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to recognize common law marriage alleged to
have been established outside of Illinois). The statute also holds as void marriages by
nonresidents who may come to Illinois to obtain a marriage they could not obtain in their own
jurisdiction. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/217 (2004).
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been legalized in the following jurisdictions: the state of Massachusetts,
2004 (the jurisdiction in the United States); 36 the Netherlands, 2001; 3 7
Belgium, 2003;38 Canada, 2003-2005; 39 Spain, 2005;40 and South
Africa, 2005. 4 1
2. Civil Unions, Domestic Partnerships, and Other Alternatives
In the United States, seven states have enacted statewide legal
protections for same-sex couples analogous to marriage in the last ten
years: Hawaii, 'reciprocal benefits,' 1997;42 Vermont, civil unions,
1998;4 3 California, domestic partnerships, 2000, 2002, and 2005;44 New
36. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Opinions of the
Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 571-72 (Mass. 2004). Other jurisdictions on the county
or municipal level followed suit, but all of these statutes have been invalidated by the courts: San
Francisco, California, February-March, 2004 (Lockyer v. City and County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459,
499 (Cal. 2004)); New Paltz, New York, 2004 (Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 366 (2006));
Multnomah County, Oregon, 2004 (legality initially not resolved, decision made questionable
given passage of state constitutional amendment barring recognition of same-sex marriages in
November of 2004; ultimately rejected by Oregon Supreme Court, Li v. Oregon, 110 P.3d 91
(2005)); Sandoval County, New Mexico, 2004 (case pending-the Sandoval County District
Court granted a temporary restraining order on Mar. 23, 2004, preventing the issuance of same-
sex marriage licenses [State v. Dunlop, d-1329-CV-200400292, case history available at
http://www.nmcourts.comlcaselookup], mandamus to lift the injunction was denied by the New
Mexico Supreme Court. [Dunlop v. Madrid, No. 28,730, Order available at
http://domawatch.org/stateissues/newmexico/index.html]).
37. The Netherlands has certain residency requirements. One party must either have Dutch
nationality or reside in the Netherlands. Linda Silberman, Same Sex Marriage: Refining the
Conflict of Laws Analysis, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2195, 2202 (2005). See also The Dutch Ministry
of Justice, Same-Sex Marriage, http://english.justitie.nl/images/Same-sex%20marriages-tcm35-
14198.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2006) (stating the conditions and consequences of same-sex
marriage as well as the rights and obligations upon divorce).
38. One party must have lived in Belgium for a minimum of three months. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, FAMILY, UNVALUED: DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-
SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW 153 (2006), http://hrw.org/reports/ 2006/us0506/10.htm.
39. No residency requirements to marry; one year residency requirement to obtain a
dissolution; effective 2003 (Ont., B.C.); 2004 (Que., N.S., Man., Yukon, Sask.) and 2005,
nationally, Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698; Equal Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples, http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/incanada.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2006)
(summarizing provincial timelines); Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders [GLAD],
http://glad.org/marriage/canadianmarriage-faq.shtml (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (stating
requirements for marriage and divorce).
40. Proyecto de Ley, Por la que se modifica el C6digo Civil en materia de derecho a contraer
matrimonio (B.O.E. 2005, 121/000018).
41. Minister of Home Affairs & Others v. Fourie & Others 2005 (60) SA 1 (CC) at 101-02 (S.
Aft.) (Decided on December 1, 2005, to take effect within one year.).
42. See Hawaii State Department of Health, http://www.hawaii.gov/healthlvital-records/vital-
records/reciprocal/index.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (explaining Reciprocal Beneficiary
relationship requirements, including the two individuals must be unmarried and must be
prohibited by state law from marrying one another, which, if satisfied, will entitle the two
individuals to certain rights and benefits that are presently available only to married couples).
43. The law was passed by the Vermont Legislature in response to the Vermont Supreme
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Jersey, domestic partnerships, 2004;45 Maine, domestic partnerships,
2004;46 and Connecticut, civil unions, 2005. 47  Additionally, domestic
partnership registries are common, mostly on the municipal or
countywide level in many places in the United States. These registries
are distinct from the statewide domestic partnership or civil union laws,
as they typically confer no legal status on the relationship or limit such
status to the jurisdiction.
Further, marriage-like legal protections have been enacted nationally
by a number of countries since 1989, when Denmark became the first to
recognize same-sex couples by passage of a "registered partnership"
Court's mandate in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (holding that the Vermont
Constitution entitles same-sex couples to the same protections and benefits under Vermont law as
married opposite-sex couples). Civil unions granted under Vermont law are neither expressly
recognized nor expressly prohibited by any state in the nation. By definition, they apply only to
unions residing in Vermont, although they have no residency requirement for issuance, and they
have been obtained by persons from other states. Obtaining dissolution of them outside of
Vermont has proved daunting. See, e.g., Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. Ct.
2002) (affirming trial court's dismissal of an action to dissolve a same-sex Vermont civil union
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), cert. granted in part, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2002), appeal
dismissed as moot (Dec. 31, 2002); Associated Press, Houston Judge Dismisses Gay Divorce
Case, Apr. 2, 2003. But see Alons v. Iowa Dist. Ct. for Woodbury County, 698 N.W.2d 858
(Iowa 2005) (holding petitioners did not have standing to challenge the district court's amended
decree granting termination of a Vermont civil union through exercise of general equitable
subject matter jurisdiction under Iowa law to dissolve a marriage); Alan J. Jacobs et al., The First
Lesbian Divorce?, LESBIAN/GAY LAW NOTES, http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usalegal/lgln/2003/05.03
(Arthur S. Leonard ed., May 2003) (citing In re the Marriage of Misty Gorman and Sherry Gump,
No. 02-D-292 (W. Va. Fam. Ct., Marion County Jan. 3, 2003)).
44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 et seq. (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (effective January 1, 2005).
The law confers most benefits and burdens of marriage, including vesting of community property
rights, presumptions of parentage, duties of spousal support, benefits and burdens of the
dissolution statute. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). State residency is
not required for registration of a domestic partnership-it can even be done be mail-but it is
required for dissolution. The law is retroactive in most applications for those who registered as
domestic partnerships under 1/1/2000 or 1/1/2003 prior domestic partnership statutes (Statsl999,
c. 588 (A B 26), as amended Stats2001, c. 893 (A B 25), Stats2003, c. 421 (A B 205), operative
Jan. 1, 2005). Community property will be deemed to have vested in the partnership
(community) as of the date of registration, even if such registration occurred prior to the effective
date of the later, comprehensive statute. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(m)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 2006).
45. Same-sex couples; also available to opposite sex, unmarried couples where each is over
the age of 62. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A-4(b)(5) (West Supp. 2006). The law provides for no
parental rights; inheritance rights; or rights to spousal support. Parties may file a joint state tax
return. New Jersey Division of Taxation, The Domestic Partnership Act: New Jersey Income
Tax/Inheritance Tax, Feb. 18, 2004, http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/taxation/index.htm?
dompartact.htm-mainFrame (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
46. An Act to Promote the Financial Security of Maine's Families and Children, 2004 Me.
Acts 1579. The Act confers few rights, mostly of status.
47. An Act Concerning Civil Unions, 2005 Conn. Acts 05-10 (residency required; grants all
the same rights and responsibilities as spouses under state law). Connecticut's civil union law is
perhaps the most comprehensive of the seven cited here, equal to, if not surpassing, California's.
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law, followed by Norway (1993); Sweden (1994); Iceland (1996);
France ("Pact Civile," 1999);48 Germany (Lebenspartnerschaft, 2001);
Finland (2002); the United Kingdom (Civil Partnership, 2004); and
Switzerland (2004, 2005). 4 9 Other countries that have extended such
protections include Israel, New Zealand, Hungary, Portugal, and
Croatia.
3. Cohabitation and Common-Law Marriage
Cohabitation is no longer illegal in most jurisdictions in the United
States. Common-law marriages are legal in nearly one-third of the
states, with certain exceptions. 50  Illinois abolished common-law
marriage in 1905.51 The claim of common-law marriage rights or
interests by or between persons in same-sex relationships in Illinois is
merely anecdotal. There are no reported cases that rested on the
assertion of such claims, although they may have been raised either by
the parties or the court as secondary, alternative, or ancillary claims.52
48. Law No. 99-944 of Nov. 15, 1999, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Franqaise [J 0]
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 16, 1999, pp. 16959-61 ("Pacte Civil de Solidaritd" ["Civil
Society Pacts"]) available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/texteconsolide/AREBT.htm.
49. Switzerland approved civil unions by a three-fourths majority of Parliament in 2004, after
which opponents put the measure to a referendum. In June 2005, Switzerland became the first
country to approve civil unions by referendum, with over 58% voting in favor of the law.
Wikipedia, Civil Unions in Switzerland, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilCivil-unions in
Switzerland (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
50. Alabama, Colorado, Georgia (if created before January 1, 1997), Idaho (if created before
January 1, 1996), Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire (only for inheritance purposes), Ohio
(if created before January 1, 1991); Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, Utah, and the District of Columbia. Which States Recognize Common Law Marriage?
www.nolo.com/resource.cfm/catlD/697DBAFE-20FF-467A-9E9395985EE7E825/118/304/192
(then follow "Common Law marriage FAQ" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 11, 2006).
51. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/214 (2004) ("Common law marriages contracted in this State
after June 30, 1905 are invalid."). Illinois will recognize a common-law marriage from another
state where the parties reside in another state that recognizes common-law marriage, and then
move to Illinois. In re Mosher, 612 N.E.2d 838, 840 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1993). "Where the
parties are domiciled in another State at the time of contracting a common law marriage, valid in
such State, such marriage will be considered valid here upon their removal to Illinois." Allen v.
Storer, 600 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1992).
52. See, e.g., In re Estate of Andrea Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998)
(rejecting claim of same-sex partner of intestate descendant for recognition of common-law
marriage with decedent). See infra Part III.B.4.
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B. Illinois and Its Peculiarities
1. No Same-Sex Marriage, No Recognition of Same-Sex Relationships
In Illinois, the twin prohibitions against same-sex marriage on the
one hand,53 and against recognition or enforcement of agreements
between unmarried persons where the consideration for the agreement
includes 'sexual relations' 54 on the other, leaves same-sex couples
without protection, without recognition, and without recourse for rights
and interests arising out of the relationship. No recognition of same-sex
marriage rights or interests exists under Illinois law, irrespective of
where the marriage was performed, or the residence or domicile of the
parties to the marriage.55 Neither are there any legally sanctioned
alternatives to marriage under Illinois law, whatever the gender of the
parties to the marriage. There is no parallel provision of law for
unmarried couples analogous to the institution of marriage granted and
governed by statute, including the additional rights and interests in each
of the parties, arising from the marital relationship and vested in the
marital estate, independent of contract or title. 56 There is no statutory
provision in Illinois law barring-or indeed, governing-agreements
between two persons, which would apply to the rights of unmarried
couples. Likewise, Illinois has no provisions in statutory law, and there
is no reported case law, requiring that the rights of unmarried persons to
a relationship be secured by a contract, or that such a contract, if entered
into, be in writing 57 or, similarly, barring the rights of two such persons
to contract. Absent statutory provision for the relationship as a whole
(such as marriage), the courts are left to define such rights and
53. See supra note 32 (outlining Illinois law requiring parties to be of opposite gender to be
married).
54. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Ill. 1979) (finding private contracts based
upon consideration that includes sexual relations unenforceable under Illinois law).
55. See supra note 32 (describing law mandating that individuals may not be married in
Illinois unless they are of the opposite sex).
56. In Illinois, forming and dissolving relationships between two persons who are emotionally
and financially interdependent is governed either by the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act (IMDMA), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101 et seq. (2004) where marriage is available
or, where it is not, by private contract. There is no other statutory provision for forming unions
between two persons in Illinois, excepting various provisions of the Illinois Business
Corporations Act of 1983 (IBCA), 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 et seq. (2004), and particularly, the
Uniform Partnership Act, adopted at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205 et seq. (2004). However, while
such laws could arguably provide some relief to unmarried persons, the nature of the relationship
(business partnerships) is presumably fundamentally different than a relationship of emotional
and financial interdependence and, therefore, they are not part of this discussion.
57. By contrast, under the Illinois Frauds Act, contracts incident upon a marriage must be in
writing to be enforceable. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 80/1 (2004).
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remedies: in terms of contract law if a governing agreement exists, or,
where express agreements are either absent or unenforceable, in terms
of equitable remedies, if at all.
58
Lacking same-sex marital status, the rights and interests of same-sex
couples in Illinois are no different than those of opposite-sex partners in
similar relationships, who similarly lack formal legal protection for their
unmarried status. But while unmarried couples in Illinois are free to
contract with each other and to enter into agreements defining their
rights, interests, and intentions as to their relationship and division of
their property, as well as their rights and interests upon its dissolution,
59
the freedom to do so is eclipsed by the lack of recognition and absence
of remedies at law, and threatened (if not rendered less than reliable) by
the refusal of Illinois courts to recognize, enforce, or redress
relationship agreements or contracts between or claims brought by
unmarried partners, irrespective of the couple's gender. "[T]he State's
dichotomous policy on cohabitation ...is to respect 'purely private
relationships' without debasing 'public morality.' . . Our State's public
policy disfavors private contractual alternatives to marriage."60
2. Hewitt v. Hewitt61
In a case that continues to resound in courts across the country, 62 and
in response to a claim for enforcement of an agreement between two
unmarried persons of the opposite sex in a state which did not recognize
common-law marriage, 63 the Illinois Supreme Court held in 1979 that
58. See, e.g., Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1983) (holding that
"where claims do not arise from a relationship between parties and are not rights closely
resembling those arising from conventional marriages," public policy does not bar judicial
recognition of mutual property rights between knowingly unmarried cohabitants).
59. See supra Part II (discussing distinction between marriage and contract relationships).
60. Mister v. A.R.K. P'ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990) (internal
citations omitted) (citing Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 424 (Ill. 1979)); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394
N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979) (holding private contracts based upon consideration that includes
sexual relations unenforceable under Illinois law).
61. 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979).
62. Most states cite Hewitt, although few rely on it and most decline to follow it. Hewitt was
decided three years after the 1976 decision of the California Supreme Court, Marvin v. Marvin,
557 P.2d 106 (1976), which held that even in the absence of express agreements, equitable
remedies could be invoked to grant redress to unmarried parties in such relationships and that
parties to such relationships could enter into express contracts providing for the rights and
interests attendant upon their relationship. Id. at 22. It is generally agreed that Hewitt in no small
measure was decided in light of, and perhaps in response to, Marvin. To date, the two cases
arguably form opposite ends of a continuum in the law of rights and remedies to unmarried,
cohabiting persons among the fifty states; nearly all reported cases from other jurisdictions since
1979 fall somewhere in between, and most cite, as persuasive authority, one or the other.
63. See supra note 51 (noting that Illinois abolished common-law marriage in 1905).
[Vol. 38
The Rights of Same-Sex Partners in Illinois
contracts between unmarried persons could (presumably) only be valid
and enforceable where the agreement is valid according to the law of
contracts, and where the consideration does not include sexual
relations. 64  Without exception, the decision of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Hewitt, proclaiming the state's professed public policy
"disfavor[ing] private contractual alternatives to marriage, '"65 continues
to hold unperturbed and generally unchallenged sway in Illinois, barring
both the legal recognition of such relationships as well as actions for
enforcement of rights or interests arising from them. Illinois law on the
subject of the rights and interests of unmarried cohabiting persons
continues to be defined by this clear and unequivocal decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court issued twenty-seven years ago, at a time when
cohabitation was still defined as a criminal element of fornication under
Illinois law,66 and the then-recent decision of the California Supreme
Court in the so-called palimony case of Marvin v. Marvin67 was
looming large and was, apparently, of some moment to the court.
3. Discussion: Hewitt
Victoria and Robert Hewitt lived from 1960 to 1975 "in an unmarried
family-like relationship to which three children were born"68 for which
Victoria relied on Robert's "promise [to] 'share his life, his future, his
earnings and his property' with her and all of [his] property resulted
from the parties' joint endeavors." 69  The plaintiff, Victoria Hewitt,
64. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209. And presumably without regard to either marital status or
gender. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the rights of unmarried persons in Illinois, post-Hewitt).
65. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
66. See infra note 75 (noting that "open and notorious" cohabitation was an element of
fornication until the statute was amended in 1990).
67. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). Marvin issued in 1976, a year before the enactment of the new
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA), codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/101 et seq. (2004).
68. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
69. Id. The court recited the facts as follows:
The factual background alleged or testified to is that in June 1960, when she and
defendant were students at Grinnell College in Iowa, plaintiff became pregnant; that
defendant thereafter told her that they were husband and wife and would live as such,
no formal ceremony being necessary, and that he would "share his life, his future, his
earnings and his property" with her; that the parties immediately announced to their
respective parents that they were married and thereafter held themselves out as
husband and wife; that in reliance on defendant's promises she devoted her efforts to
his professional education and his establishment in the practice of pedodontia,
obtaining financial assistance from her parents for this purpose; that she assisted
defendant in his career with her own special skills and although she was given payroll
checks for these services she placed them in a common fund; that defendant, who was
without funds at the time of the marriage, as a result of her efforts now earns over
$80,000 a year and has accumulated large amounts of property, owned either jointly
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initially brought an action for divorce, which was dismissed (in part) on
a motion to dismiss for want of a valid marriage; the trial court directed
the petitioner to amend her complaint accordingly. 70  Victoria filed an
amended complaint, seeking an "equal share of the profits and
properties accumulated by the parties" during the period they lived
together as husband and wife. 7 1  The amended complaint was "also
dismissed, the trial court finding that Illinois law and public policy
require such claims to be based on a valid marriage." 72  The Supreme
Court agreed with the trial court's findings, reversing the Illinois
Appellate Court and clearly and unequivocally rejecting all of Victoria
Hewitt's claims.73
with her or separately; that she has given him every assistance a wife and mother could
give, including social activities designed to enhance his social and professional
reputation.
Id.
70. Id. (explaining that since paternity had been admitted, a portion of the cause of action
would survive).
71. Id.
Plaintiff . alleg[ed] the following bases for her claim: (1) that because defendant
promised he would "share his life, his future, his earnings and his property" with her
and all of defendant's property resulted from the parties' joint endeavors, plaintiff is
entitled in equity to a one-half share; (2) that the conduct of the parties evinced an
implied contract entitling plaintiff to one-half the property accumulated during their
"family relationship"; (3) that because defendant fraudulently assured plaintiff she was
his wife in order to secure her services, although he knew they were not legally
married, defendant's property should be impressed with a trust for plaintiffs benefit;
(4) that because plaintiff has relied to her detriment on defendant's promises and
devoted her entire life to him, defendant has been unjustly enriched.
Id.
72. Id. at 1206.
The appellate court reversed, stating that because the parties had outwardly lived a
conventional married life, plaintiff's conduct had not "'so affronted public policy that
she should be denied any and all relief' and that plaintiffs complaint stated a cause of
action on an express oral contract. We granted leave to appeal. Defendant apparently
does not contest his obligation to support the children, and that question is not before
us.
The appellate court, in reversing, gave considerable weight to the fact that the parties
had held themselves out as husband and wife for over 15 years. The court noted that
they had lived "a most conventional, respectable and ordinary family life" that did not
openly flout accepted standards, the "single flaw" being the lack of a valid marriage.
Indeed the appellate court went so far as to say that the parties had "lived within the
legitimate boundaries of a marriage and family relationship of a most conventional
sort" an assertion which that court cannot have intended to be taken literally. Noting
that the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act does not prohibit nonmarital
cohabitation and that the Criminal Code of 1961 makes fornication an offense only if
the behavior is open and notorious, the appellate court concluded that plaintiff should
not be denied relief on public policy grounds.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
73. Id. at 1211.
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Hewitt stands for the proposition that private contracts based upon
consideration that includes sexual relations are unenforceable under
Illinois law.7 4 Driven by state public policy questions as to morality,75
and specifically (at least in this instance) as to its interest in promoting
the institution of marriage, the decision embraced and repeatedly
underscored policy concerns about the availability of marriage to the
parties. 76 Reversing the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court
rejected all claims advanced by Victoria Hewitt, and declared that the
state's Marriage Act "gives the State a strong continuing interest in the
institution of marriage and prevents the marriage relation from
becoming in effect a private contract terminable at will." 77 Considering
the claims of both parties as those of unmarried, heterosexual
individuals to whom the institution of marriage was readily available
but common-law marriage was not, and as the lack of any viable
alternative to cohabitation was not at issue,78 the court questioned
"whether it is appropriate for this court to grant a legal status to a
private arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage
sanctioned by the State." 79  In a clear and strongly worded decision
which overturned the appellate court and denied the "wife" all relief
sought, the court concluded it was not.8 °
Although the holding in Hewitt8 l is in fact cognizant of the gender of
the parties and the availability of marriage to them, it depends upon
neither. Instead, the holding was based primarily on the court's
consideration of claims to enforce an express contract outside of
74. Id. at 1208. By contrast, Marvin found such arrangements unenforceable only where the
sexual component of the relationship is an "inseparable part of the consideration for the
agreement." Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976).
75. At the time of the Hewitt decision, "open and notorious' cohabitation was an element of
the crime of fornication under Illinois law. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-8 (2004). The statute was
amended Jan. 1, 1990, by removal of "cohabitation" from the definition of fornication. See infra
Section III.B.4 (discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d
421, 424 (Ill. 1980), decided post-Hewitt, in which the court stated that cohabitation was
"injurious to the moral well-being and development" of children).
76. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
77. Id.
78. A threshold legal and practical matter for two persons of the same sex.
79. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
80. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Drews, 487 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1985).
Illinois has long recognized and honored the sanctity of the marital bond. In fact the stated
purpose of the IMDMA itself is to "'strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and
safeguard family relationships" (ILL. REV. STAT. 1983, ch. 40, par. 102(2)). This policy indicates
"1a strong continuing interest in the institution of marriage and prevents the marriage relation from
becoming in effect a private contract terminable at will."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
81. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1207-08.
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marriage in a relationship of economic and emotional interdependence,
focusing on the existence of sexual relations as an element or
component of such claims-or, put otherwise, where the "claims ...
depend on the cohabitation itself."'82 The court was unwilling to find
that the agreement itself could rest on sound contractual basis absent, or
without regard to, sexual relations. 83  "In a discussion of contract
principles ... the court noted that agreements based on sexual services
are void for want of legal consideration and that Illinois courts would
not enforce what in effect are private contracts for marriage-like
relationships." 84  The court suggested that to enforce such contracts
would grant legal status to cohabitation: "[tihe situation alleged here
was not the kind of arm's length bargain envisioned by traditional
contract principles, but an intimate arrangement of a fundamentally
different kind."85
Because its holding is not dependent upon the gender of the parties
being different (or "opposite sex"), its applicability is likely not so
restricted either. Such contracts between unmarried, same-sex couples
likely cannot withstand a challenge raising Hewitt as a defense.
4. The Rights of Unmarried Persons in Illinois, Post-Hewitt
Although Hewitt has been widely criticized by other courts and by
commentators, in Illinois it remains an absolute bar to the enforcement
of express contracts between unmarried persons where the consideration
for the contract includes sexual relations or where, arguably, the
contract itself is the result of an attempt by two unmarried persons to
secure the rights and interests to their relationship. It has been
repeatedly invoked in a number of cases brought by persons of the
opposite sex, and on different grounds by persons of the same sex, to
bar the rights of unmarried persons and attempts to enforce rights or
82. Medley v. Strong, 558 N.E.2d 244, 246 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1990).
83. Id. at 247.
84. Id. at 247.
85. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
Illinois' public policy regarding agreements such as the one alleged here was
implemented long ago in Wallace v. Rappleye (1882), 103 Ill. 229, 249, where this
court said: "An agreement in consideration of future illicit cohabitation between the
plaintiffs is void." This is the traditional rule, in force until recent years in all
jurisdictions. (See, E.g., Gauthier v. Laing (1950), 96 N.H. 80, 70 A.2d 207; Grant v.
Butt (1941), 198 S.C. 298, 17 S.E.2d 689.) Section 589 of the Restatement of Contracts
(1932) states, "A bargain in whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual
intercourse or of a promise thereof is illegal." See also 6A Corbin, Contracts sec. 1476
(1962), and cases cited therein.
Id. at 1208.
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interests based upon their relationship to one another, whether the rights
asserted were founded upon express or implied contracts, or other
claims arising from the relationship.
Hewitt was first cited in Jarrett v. Jarrett,86 where the same Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, and
upheld the trial court's change of custody of three children from the
mother to the father, predicated only upon the open and continuing
cohabitation of the custodial parent with a person of the opposite sex.
87
Eleven years later, in Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, the Illinois Appellate
Court, Second District, held that the refusal to rent apartments to
unmarried couples of the opposite sex did not violate the prohibition
against discrimination based on sex or marital status found in the
Illinois Human Rights Act. 88  The court in Mister found the plaintiff's
interpretation of the legislature's intent to be irreconcilable with the
state's established policies disfavoring unmarried cohabitation and
common-law marriage, 89 and concluded that "it is much more likely
86. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421,423-26 (Ill. 1979).
87. The court held that such a change is not "contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
in the absence of any tangible evidence of contemporaneous adverse effect upon the minor
children." Id. at 423. Citing both Hewitt and much earlier cases, the court in Jarrett declared, "It
is, in our judgment, clear that [the mother's] conduct offends prevailing public policy." The court
further proclaimed that the mother's "disregard for existing standards of conduct instructs her
children, by example, that they, too, may ignore them and could well encourage the children to
engage in similar activity in the future. That factor, of course, supports the trial court's conclusion
that their daily presence in that environment was injurious to the moral well-being and
development of the children." Id. at 424, (internal citation omitted); see also H. Joseph Gitlin,
Sexual Moraliy and Children of Divorce, 92 ILL. BAR J. 468 (Sept. 2004) (reviewing the Jarrett
standard and how Illinois courts weigh parents' sexual misconduct in custody proceedings).
88. Mister v. A.R.K. P'ship., 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1160 (ll. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1990).
89. Id. The court declared that:
In determining whether the [Illinois Human Rights] Act protects cohabitation by
unmarried adults of the opposite sex, we would be remiss if we did not examine the
public policies embodied in the criminal prohibition against fornication found in
section 11-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 11-
8) and the statutory renouncement of common-law marriages found in section 214 of
the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par.
214).
Id. at 1157.
Although the court acknowledged that the prohibition against "open and notorious" cohabitation,
as an element of criminal fornication, had been removed from the statute (it was amended,
effective January 1, 1990), the court reasoned that "the statutory fornication provision was in
effect the time the Act was adopted, when the alleged discrimination occurred, and also when the
complaint with the Commission was filed," and cited with approval by the Illinois Supreme Court
in Jarrett-decided eleven years before the amendment of the criminal fornication statute-where
it noted that the fornication statute expressed the State's public policy against open and notorious
nonmarital cohabitation. Id. The court set forth its rationale:
Although it seems that the criminal prohibition against fornication may have fallen into
disuse, the court in Jarrett gave the policy underlying the fornication statute continued
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that the legislature, cognizant of the public policy against open and
notorious cohabitation, declined to extend the Act's protections to
unmarried cohabitants regardless of whether the couple's conduct was
open and notorious." 90
Similarly, in 1998, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, upheld
the dismissal of a probate action brought by a lesbian against the estate
of her deceased partner,91 finding that the plaintiff was not a legal
spouse and that even if the state's prohibition against same-sex
vitality in the marital dissolution setting. The court there stated that both the
"fornication statute and the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act evidence
the relevant moral standards of this State, as declared by our legislature." Thus, the
criminal prohibition against fornication continues to represent Illinois' public policy on
this issue. Furthermore, we need not consider what effect the revised fornication
statute has on Jarrett and the public policy of this State.
Mister, 553 N.E.2d at 1157 (internal citations omitted).
90. Id. at 1158. The Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA), 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 -101
et seq. (West Supp. 2006) was amended, effective January 1, 2006, by passage of amendments to
bar discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation" in employment, real estate transactions,
access to financial credit, and to public accommodations. The amendment to the IHRA barring
discrimination against sexual orientation and gender identity is accomplished in two steps. First,
the Act is amended to include sexual orientation among the protected categories declared to be
"free . from unlawful discrimination." Second, sexual orientation is broadly and inclusively
defined, expressly including not only homosexuality and gender identity, but heterosexuality and
bisexuality as well. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(0-1) (West Supp. 2006).
The IHRA, as amended, provides that:
§ 1-102. Declaration of Policy. It is the public policy of this State:
(A) Freedom from Unlawful Discrimination. To secure for all individuals within
Illinois the freedom from discrimination against any individual because of his or her
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, physical or
mental handicap, military status, sexual orientation, or unfavorable discharge from
military service in connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to
financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations.
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102(A) (West Supp. 2006).
The IHRA as amended, includes both "general definitions" applicable throughout the Act, "unless
the context requires otherwise," 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103 (West Supp. 2006), and
specific definitions that "are applicable strictly in the context of [a particular] Article within the
Act," e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-101 (West Supp. 2006). The terms "unlawful
discrimination" and "sexual orientation" are general definitions applicable throughout the
amended Act. Unlawful discrimination is defined as "discrimination against a person because of
his or her race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, handicap,
military status, sexual orientation, or unfavorable discharge from military service as those terms
are defined in this Section." 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(Q) (West Supp. 2006). Sexual
orientation is defined as "actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, or
gender-related identity, whether or not traditionally associated with the person's designated sex at
birth." 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-103(0-1) (West Supp. 2006).
The IHRA was first enacted in 1979 and became law in 1980. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 et
seq. The amendment to include sexual orientation was first proposed in the 1970s. Associated
Press, State Joins 16 Others With Gay Rights Laws, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 2, 2006, Redeye Ed.
However, the law was not passed until 2005 and did not come into effect until 2006. Id.
91. In re Estate of Andrea Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201, 202-03 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).
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marriages 92 could be found to be invalid, "in this case the relationship
between petitioner and Hall was, at all times, nothing more than a
private contract terminable at will" and Hewitt would "preclude [the
court] from imposing different terms to the [parties'] 'private
contract.' 93  The court further stated that "the policy of the [Illinois
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage] Act gives the State a strong
continuing interest in the institution of marriage and prevents the
marriage relation from becoming in effect a private contract terminable
at will." 94  The court also rejected the plaintiff's claim of a putative
spouse,95 noting that "in this case, petitioner admits that she knew that
she was not legally married to Hall.96 Consequently, the putative
spouse provision fails to confer spouse status upon petitioner."
97
5. Independent Claims
Given the lack of legal recognition of unmarried relationships under
Illinois law, parties have two options. First, presuming they have
executed a contract otherwise valid at law but lacking recognition or
enforcement under Hewitt,9 8 either party could seek enforcement of the
contract or remedies for breach in a court of equity, in which case the
law of contracts would require a valid contract, a breach, and the right
to a remedy. Likely claims include unjust enrichment or, where there is
no written or express agreement, an implied-in-fact contract or a suit for
92. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212(a)(5) (2004); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/213.1 (2004).
93. In re Hall, 707 N.E.2d at 206.
94. Id., citing Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ill. 1979).
95. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/305 (2004).
Sec. 305. Putative Spouse. Any person, having gone through a marriage ceremony,
who has cohabited with another to whom he is not legally married in the good faith
belief that he was married to that person is a putative spouse until knowledge of the
fact that he is not legally married terminates his status and prevents acquisition of
further rights. A putative spouse acquires the rights conferred upon a legal spouse,
including the right to maintenance following termination of his status, whether or not
the marriage is prohibited, under Section 212 [750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212], or
declared invalid, under Section 301 [750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/301]. If there is a legal
spouse or other putative spouse, rights acquired by a putative spouse do not supersede
the rights of the legal spouse or those acquired by other putative spouses, but the court
shall apportion property, maintenance and support rights among the claimants as
appropriate in the circumstances and in the interests of justice. This Section shall not
apply to common law marriages contracted in the State after June 30, 1905.
Id.
See also, In re Marriage of May, 678 N.E.2d 71, 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1997) (holding that
putative spouse status only applies to those not legally married and is lost when the marriage is
ratified by law).
96. In re Hall, 707 N.E.2d at 205.
97. Id.
98. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Il. 1979).
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constructive trust. There is no guidance in Illinois law for such
remedies and, accordingly, the question of the availability and scope of
remedies is answered, again, by both contract law and the decision in
Hewitt.99 Given the foregoing, if the claim is in any sense inseparable
from emotional or financial interdependence where any consideration
includes sexual relations, it is unlikely to survive a motion to dismiss.
Second, a party could seek recognition or enforcement of specific rights
or interests independent of a claim for the validity or recognition of the
relationship itself-based upon other relationships or legal interests
arising from or related to the relationship such as parentage, 100 claims
of domestic violence, 10 1 or on specific claims or rights arising from the
interest (e.g., title to property). 10 2 In either instance, the fact of the lack
99. Id.
100. Under the custody provisions of the IMDMA, a person defined as a parent may bring an
action for custody, visitation, support or related claims to a child, without regard to marital status
or to gender:
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601. Jurisdiction; Commencement of Proceeding
I...I
(b) A child custody proceeding is commenced in the court:
(1) by a parent, by filing a petition:
(i) for dissolution of marriage or legal separation or declaration of invalidity of
marriage; or
(ii) for custody of the child, in the county in which he is permanently resident or
found; or
(2) by a person other than a parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the
county in which he is permanently resident or found, but only if he is not in the
physical custody of one of his parents; or
(3) by a stepparent, by filing a petition, if all of the following circumstances are met
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b). See also In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1995) (expressly holding that the Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1 et seq., "must
be construed to give standing to the unmarried persons in these cases, regardless of sex or sexual
orientation, to petition for adoption jointly"). Illinois is an "all-or-nothing" state with respect to
same-sex parentage: if the parties have legally adopted the child or children, parentage will assure
them legal rights to the child under the custody provisions of the IMDMA. Absent parentage, no
claims of de facto, equitable, or psychological parentage are recognized under Illinois law, and a
party asserting such claims is likely to lose. See In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316, 320 (111. App. Ct.
1st Dist. 1999) (finding lesbian asserting right to visitation lacked standing under visitation
statute, absent legally cognizable claim of parentage).
101. For example, under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (IDVA), 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
60 et seq. (2004), if the relationship is classified as that of an "'abused person" relative to another,
where one party is a "family or household member," the statute grants a broad range of remedies,
including support and the temporary exclusive possession of property held by one of the parties.
in the context of the entry of an Order of Protection, without regard to marital status or to gender.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/214 (2004).
102. 27AAM. JUR. 2D Equity § 52 (2006) ("A court of equity has broad equitable jurisdiction
to protect property rights against a wrongdoer."). They are not generally a function of the
"whole" relationship and they arise from title or other indicia or rights of ownership of particular
property and are not, accordingly, determinative of the rights and interests of either party in or to
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of recognized marital status should not bar such claims, where the
holding of Hewitt and its progeny specifically address the consideration
for the relationship itself.
6. Equitable Remedies: Hewitt No Bar Where the Claims Are
"Substantially Independent"'
10 3
Specific equitable remedies have not necessarily been impaired in
Illinois by the court's holding in Hewitt, even where the court refused to
grant equitable remedies for unjust enrichment. 10 4 In Spafford v. Coats,
the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, overruled the trial court's
decision based upon Hewitt and allowed a claim for unjust enrichment
between two persons of the opposite sex, finding that one unmarried
party who furnished most of the money for several vehicles purchased
during a cohabitating relationship was not barred from bringing an
unjust enrichment claim against the other, who retained control over the
vehicles. 10 5 Spafford was decided on particular facts-on a claim for a
constructive trust for vehicles the parties had purchased during their
cohabitation (most of which were financed and purchased with
substantial contributions from the plaintiff)-and not for recognition of
or rights arising from the relationship itself.
The court in Spafford distinguished the facts from those in Hewitt,
finding that Spafford's claims were "substantially independent" of the
parties' relationship and were "not based on rights arising from their
cohabitation" or the performance of domestic services. 10 6 Because the
claim in Spafford was limited, however, to particular property and not
the property of the relationship as a whole. See infra Part 11.B.6 (discussing equitable claims in
Illinois).
103. Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241, 245 (111. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1983).
104. Id. at 243.
105. Id. at 245-46.
106. Id. at 245.
We perceive the real and underlying concern of the supreme court in Hewitt was that
judicial recognition of mutual property rights between knowingly unmarried
cohabitants-where the claim is based upon or intimately related to the cohabitation of
the parties-would in effect grant to unmarried cohabitants substantially the same
marital rights enjoyed by married persons, resurrect the doctrine of common law
marriage, and contravene the public policy enunciated by the Illinois legislature to
strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage. The plaintiffs claims in Hewitt for
one-half of defendant's property were based primarily upon her services as
housekeeper and homemaker and obviously fell afoul of the court's concerns.
However, where the claims do not arise from the relationship between the parties and
are not rights closely resembling those arising from conventional marriages, we
conclude that the public policy expressed in Hewitt does not bar judicial recognition of
such claims.
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the relationship, it is unlikely that such a claim would have been
allowed, in light of Hewitt, to enforce an express agreement between
unmarried persons to share property where the consideration included
intimate relations involved in a relationship based upon financial and
emotional interdependence, irrespective of the gender of the parties or
their ability to marry legally.
IV. CONCLUSION
The rights and interests of unmarried, same-sex couples in Illinois,
and the validity and enforceability of agreements between them to
secure the rights and interests in their relationships-including the issue
of whether such agreements are recognized or enforceable-is sharply
framed and answered by Hewitt, which holds that such agreements are
likely illegal where any part of the consideration includes sexual
relations. 10 7 After Hewitt, an otherwise valid contract between any two
unmarried persons as to their rights and interests in their relationship
would likely be held void, voidable, or otherwise unenforceable in
Illinois simply because the parties are not married, and irrespective of
whether or not they had the legal right to do so or whether such
marriage was valid where celebrated. The validity of such agreements
is rarely upheld when challenged, depriving the parties of the very
benefits and burdens contracted for, including the availability and
enforceability of interests upon dissolution. The parties are then left to
pursue piecemeal rights and interests arising from specific title to
particular property acquired irrespective of the partnership or, in some
instances, to proceed on equitable theories of constructive trust or unjust
enrichment.
The query, then, is whether such agreements can ever be valid and
enforceable in Illinois. Nearly all states now permit parties to form
contracts to secure rights or interests in their relationships where the
sexual element is separable from or not an essential part of the
consideration. 10 8 This generally applies irrespective of the gender of
the parties to the relationship. Even in states where there is no legal
protection for or statutes barring discrimination against homosexuals,
the change in law since Marvin10 9 has, in the main, applied equally to
same-sex and opposite-sex couples in the enforcement of express
contracts involving property rights and interests. The bar in Illinois
under Hewitt also applies equally-although the Hewitt court squared
107. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1211 (Ill. 1979).
108. 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 276 (2006).
109. Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
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its reasoning on the availability of marriage to the parties before it. To
date, there has been no successful challenge to Hewitt.
The lawyer representing unmarried couples has no reliable basis to
advise clients under Illinois law of reliable and enforceable means to
protect their relationships, or whether courts will uphold the agreements
they may make in the course of attempts to do so. Express contracts
that explicitly disavow the emotional and financial interdependence of
the parties and presumably circumvent suggestion of sexual relations in
consideration for the contract should survive challenges based upon
Hewitt. Absent express statutory or other recognition, and because a
domestic partnership does not automatically create benefits for the
partners, unmarried persons-whether same-sex domestic partners or
otherwise-should protect themselves by creating and signing contracts
that deal with significant parts of their relationship. Considerations
should include how they hold property, what will happen to their assets
if one of them dies, or how any support obligations would be handled if
their relationship should end. Some problems can be avoided or
minimized by drafting a will, trust, health care power of attorney, living
will declaration, and cohabitation agreement. Although its holding and
argument seem to suggest otherwise, the Hewitt court noted that
"[c]ohabitation by the parties may not prevent them from forming valid
contracts about independent matters, for which it is said the sexual
relations do not form part of the consideration." 110 The best advice for
persons in Illinois seeking to enter into express agreements to secure the
rights and interests of their relationship is to provide in their contract
that its purpose is to share ownership of certain property without regard
to the parties' personal relationship. This should at least clear the
holding of Hewitt. But enforcement, or even mere recognition, is
another question. 111
110. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d at 1208 (adding that such contracts may be enforceable where, for
example, "services such as plaintiff alleges here could be regarded as the consideration for a
separate contract between the parties, severable from the illegal contract founded on sexual
relations," and citing Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 408 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979); Marvin v. Marvin, 557
P.2d 106, 113 n.5 (Cal. 1976); Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595, 597(Mich. Ct. App. 1973);
contra, Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977)). See also Latham v. Latham, 547 P.2d 144,
147 (Or. 1976) ("We are not validating an agreement in which the only or primary consideration
is sexual intercourse. The agreement here contemplated all the burdens and amenities of married
life."); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977) (allowing partition of property between a
cohabiting unmarried couple).
11. Alternatively, the parties could provide that disputes arising out of the agreement be
subject to binding arbitration, for example. Although such a provision could deprive either or
both parties of access to the courts, should such agreements later become enforceable, or should
either seek review or enforcement of a particular provision or separable equitable claim that could
arguably be found to be, if challenged, "substantially independent" of the consideration for the
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Lacking legal recognition of same-sex relationships under Illinois
law, and given the existence of unchallenged law prohibiting redress,
recognition or enforcement of agreements between unmarried persons
where the consideration for the agreement includes 'sexual relations,'
the legal rights and interests of persons in same-sex relationships in
Illinois-irrespective of where the relationship was founded or the
residency or citizenship of either or both parties-are insecure and
unreliable, at best. Protection of such relationships has changed little in
nearly thirty years since the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hewitt
v. Hewitt, despite the increasing recognition of same-sex relationships in
many jurisdictions and the increasing passage of laws designed to
protect, secure, or recognize such relationships in some respect, short of
marriage.
contract or agreement as a whole. Spafford v. Coats, 455 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist.
1983). See supra Parts HI.B.5-6 (analyzing equitable relief available for claims that are
substantially independent of the parties' relationship).
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